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But clearly the judge has acted mercifully. Now the judge had no right to 
hand down the sentence she did. But this does not imply that she has not acted 
mercifully. It implies that she has acted mercifully and unjustly. Because Murphy 
defines mercy in terms of what one has a right to do, his analysis implies that 
one act cannot be both merciful and unjust. But the judge case indicates that it 
is possible for one act to be merciful and unjust. Therefore, Murphy's analysis 
of mercy is flawed. 
Finally, neither Murphy nor Hampton considers the distinction between the 
evaluation of agents and the evaluation of actions. One can act mercifully without 
being a merciful person. Suppose that you decided to forgive my $3,000 debt 
only because you wished to impress the boss. This would be a case of merciful 
action by a person who is not merciful. For a person to be merciful, one's merciful 
actions must be motivated by compassion. Hampton's analysis is superior to 
Murphy's in this respect. While she does not consider the agent/action distinction, 
she does notice that there is a connection between mercy and compassion. Murphy 
misses this connection. 
In spite of these criticisms, this is, as I said at the outset, an impressive book. 
Anyone who is interested in the topic ought to read it. 
GEORGE W. RAINBOLT 
University of Arizona 
Olen, Jeffrey. Moral Freedom. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988. Pp. xi+ 151. $19.95 (cloth). 
Olen declares at the outset that any plausible moral theory must incorporate the 
following apparently inconsistent "truisms" (as he calls them): that moral rules 
are society's rules; that morality is a matter of individual choice; and that some 
things are wrong no matter what any society or individual says. He then seeks 
to construct a consistent theory that incorporates these claims. 
The book, as its title suggests, revolves around the second "truism." There 
are, we are told, two moral points of view: the impersonal, which has to do with 
moral rules and the duties they impose, and the personal, which has to do with 
one's personal values and one's conception of the good life. Olen claims that the 
former does not override the latter, either rationally or morally, and thus that 
one can be rationally and morally justified in performing an act which, from the 
impersonal point of view, is morally wrong. Furthermore, since the first "truism" 
concerns moral rules, and hence the impersonal point of view, it does not clash 
with the second "truism." The moral rules which apply to an individual are just 
the rules that have been worked out by that individual's society to settle conflicts 
of interest and to advance shared conceptions of the good. Nor does the third 
"truism," which also concerns the impersonal point of view, clash with the first, 
for Olen distinguishes between rules that are valid and those that are not. Valid 
rules are rules to which individuals who are willing to adopt the impersonal point 
of view freely agree. Some acts (Olen's example is of a photographer who poisons 
his lover and then films her death throes) are such that it is unimaginable that 
they would be permitted by valid rules, and hence they may be said to be wrong 
no matter what anyone says. 
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One wonders to whom this book is addressed. It is a very short book, written 
in an engaging, exceedingly personal style, full of heartfelt proclamations and 
sprightly aphorisms. Some may find this refreshing, but it is likely to prove 
baffling to many. It is not an introductory text, for familiarity with the writings 
of several philosophers is presupposed. Nor is it likely to impress seasoned phi- 
losophers, for Olen deliberately avoids the sort of detail that such readers seek. 
His criticism of the ideas of others is always extremely quick and sketchy, and 
his own ideas are never fully worked out. In particular, his key claims are, at 
best, poorly defended, as I shall now indicate. 
It is a trite observation that people have personal values-that what matters 
(deeply) to one person may not matter (at all) to another. It is quite another 
thing to claim that these values morally trump impersonal values. Even if personal 
values are accorded disproportionate moral weight, it is surely plausible to try 
to accommodate them alongside impersonal values by invoking agent-centered 
restrictions and prerogatives. Olen's rationale for denying this appears very early 
on (p. 7). "Someone has a reason for acting only if a proposed reason fits into 
her network of desires, goals, and personal projects-only, that is, if it is capable 
of motivating her. If a moral rule does not advance her desires, goals, or personal 
projects, it does not provide any reasons for her to act.... A moral rule morally 
binds someone only if it provides her with a reason for acting." This is unconvincing. 
We may grant that, in some sense of "have a reason," one has a reason for acting 
only if it fits into one's motivation set; and we may grant that, in some sense of 
"have a reason," one is morally bound to perform an act only if one has a reason 
to do so. But what is not at all obvious is that these are the same senses of "have 
a reason"; after all, what follows from assuming that they are is Olen's truly 
radical doctrine of moral freedom-a freedom which constitutes not autonomy 
but anarchy. 
Olen overlooks the fact that there is reason to believe that one can do wrong 
in failing to pursue certain personal values-consider undue self-effacement. 
Moreover, just as duty would seem sometimes to concern personal values, im- 
personal values would seem sometimes to impose, not duties but supererogatory 
goals- another fact that Olen overlooks. Olen also fails to distinguish the evaluation 
of acts from the evaluation of agents. While it seems implausible to say that 
heinous acts can be morally justified, it seems not so implausible to say that some 
people are sometimes not to be blamed for performing heinous acts. To say the 
latter is not to commit oneself to the sort of moral anarchy that Olen espouses 
in his second "truism." 
Olen, of course, regards the first "truism" as true, but he offers no defense 
of it. Similarly, he offers no defense of the sort of societal relativism presupposed 
by his way of accommodating the third "truism." This very short book is very 
short on argument; indeed, it is very short even on the articulation and elaboration 
of its central ideas. As such, while it may whet the philosophical appetite, it 
hardly begins to satisfy it. 
MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
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